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We show that firms with the least elastic demand for equity capital should benefit the most from reductions
in shareholder taxes. Consistent with this prediction, we find that, following 1997 and 2003 cuts in
U.S. individual shareholder taxes, financially constrained firms, and particularly those with disproportionate
ownership by U.S. individuals, enjoyed larger reductions in their cost of equity capital than did other
firms. The results are consistent with the incidence of the tax reductions falling mostly on firms with
the most pressing needs for capital. Furthermore, the findings provide an explanation for the heretofore
puzzling finding that, following the unprecedented 2003 reduction in dividend tax rates, non-dividend-paying
firms outperformed dividend-paying firms. Not surprisingly, we find that non-dividend-paying firms
are more financial constrained than dividend-paying firms are. When a firm’s financial constraint and
dividend choice are jointly considered, we find that the extent of financial constraint affects the change
in the cost of equity capital, but whether a firm issues a dividend does not. In other words, it appears
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1.  Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to determine the extent to which a firm’s financial 
constraint affects its cost of equity capital following changes in investors’ taxes. Prior 
studies (e.g., Dhaliwal, Krull, and Li, 2007 (hereafter, DKL), and Guenther, Jung, and 
Williams, 2005, among others) document that shareholder taxes decreased a firm’s cost 
of equity capital after the 2003 reductions in shareholder taxes. However, they ignore the 
potential impact of cross-sectional variation in the need for external capital on that causal 
relation.  
We address this void in the literature by hypothesizing that reductions in 
shareholder taxes should lower the cost of equity capital more for financially constrained 
firms than for other companies. The reason is that firms facing binding financial 
constraint have less elastic demand for external capital than other firms do and thus are 
forced to pay more to access that capital. Since factors that increase the cost of equity 
capital, such as shareholder taxes, are borne more heavily by those firms with the least 
elastic demand, reductions in those factors should benefit those firms more than firms 
with more elastic demand. Restated, since shareholder taxes increase a firm’s cost of 
equity capital, reductions in shareholder taxes should lower the cost of equity capital 
more for firms with less elastic demand (i.e., financially constrained firms) than for firms 
with less pressing needs for capital.  
We test the extent to which financial constraint matters by evaluating the two 
most recent changes in U.S. shareholder taxes: the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (TRA)   2
and the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA).
1 We analyze 
the impact of the tax rate changes by regressing various implied (ex ante) measures of the 
cost of equity capital on measures of financial constraint developed in Hadlock and 
Pierce (2010) and assorted controls.
2   
Consistent with our predictions, we find that, when shareholder tax rates are cut, 
the more severe the financial constraint a firm experiences, the larger the reduction in its 
cost of equity capital. Furthermore, as expected, we find that the reduction in the cost of 
equity capital is larger for those financially constrained stocks that are held 
disproportionately by taxable individual investors, who are subject to the shareholder 
taxes that were reduced, than for financially constrained firms that tend to access capital 
from sources that were unaffected by the rate changes, such as tax-exempt institutions, 
tax-deferred pensions, other corporations, and foreigners.   
To our knowledge, this is the first study to evaluate the impact of financial 
constraint on the relation between shareholder taxes and the cost of equity capital. Prior 
studies report that the cost of equity capital fell after shareholder tax cuts in 2003. 
However, we extend those studies to show that the reduction in the cost of equity capital 
was increasing in the inelasticity of the firm’s demand for outside capital. This implies 
that, to the extent the rate reductions were designed to mitigate barriers to the equity 
markets for financially constrained firms, the shareholder tax cuts met their desired goal. 
                                                 
1 The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 lowered the maximum statutory capital gains tax rate from 28% to 20%, 
but left the dividend tax rate unchanged at 38.6%.  The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 
2003 reduced the maximum statutory tax rate for capital gains from 20% to 15% and for dividends from 
38.6% to 15%. 
2 See Dhaliwal, Krull, Li, and Moser, (2005), Dhaliwal, Heitzman, and Li (2006), Hail and Leuz (2006), 
DKL, among others, for estimates of the cost of equity capital for firms.   3
Companies with binding financial constraint benefited from the tax legislation more than 
other firms did. 
Our results also shed light on a 2003 puzzle that has eluded scholars. DKL, 
Auerbach and Hassett (2006) and others document that JGTRRA benefited non-dividend-
paying stocks more than dividend-paying stocks. This finding is surprising because 
JGTRRA reduced dividend tax rates by an unprecedented 23.6 percentage points, while 
lowering the capital gains tax rate (the only individual shareholder tax applicable to non-
dividend-paying stocks) by a relatively modest five percentage points. A priori, we would 
have expected that the benefits from the huge dividend tax rate cuts would have 
dominated the benefits from smaller capital gains tax rates reductions. It then follows that 
since the immediate benefits of the dividend tax cut would have enjoyed solely by the 
dividend-paying firms, the returns from dividend-paying stocks should have exceeded 
those from non-dividend-paying stocks. But, alas, this was not the case; in fact the 
opposite was observed.
3 
Our findings suggest that the previous studies suffer from the omission of a 
variable that is correlated with the decision to issue dividends, namely the extent to which 
a firm is financially constrained. Not surprisingly, dividend-paying firms face less 
financial constraint than non-dividend-paying firms.
4 When we include in our regressions 
                                                 
3 DKL describe the puzzle in the following ways, “However, we find that non-dividend paying firms 
experience a larger decrease in cost of equity capital than dividend paying firms, which is inconsistent with 
existing theory and empirical evidence. This result suggests that further work is needed to more fully 
explain the relation between dividend taxes and stock prices.” (p.123). “However, overall the results for the 
dividend paying and non-dividend paying sub-samples are puzzling and suggest that further research is 
needed to fully understand the relation between dividend taxes and stock prices.” (p.145). 
4 When we segregate our sample into those paying dividends and those not paying dividends before 
JGTRRA, we find that 73% of the non-dividend-paying firms have above-median financial constraint, but 
only 27% of the dividend-paying firms are similarly constrained. Conversely, among the below-median 
financially constrained group, 63% are dividend-paying firms, but only 37% are non-dividend-paying 
firms.   4
a categorical variable, which indicates whether a firm pays dividends, and exclude a 
measure of financial constraint, the coefficient on dividend policy loads in a manner that 
suggests non-dividend-paying firms enjoyed a larger reduction in the cost of equity 
capital than did dividend-paying firms following JGTRRA. However, when we add a 
measure of financial constraint as an explanatory variable, the dividend policy variable 
becomes insignificant, while the financial constraint measure is highly significant. 
In other words, the benefits of the reductions in investor taxes appear to fall on 
financially constrained firms, which happen to be predominantly non-dividend-paying 
firms. Prior studies erroneously inferred that non-dividend-paying firms benefited more 
from JGTRRA, when actually the benefits of JGTRRA were divvied out based on 
financial constraint, not on dividend policy. Thus, we conclude that cross-sectional 
difference in the elasticity of demand for equity capital at least partially accounts for the 
heretofore inexplicable stock price responses.  
The omission of a correlated variable does not appear limited to JGTRRA studies. 
In their studies of TRA, Blouin et al, 2009, Dai et al., 2008, and Lang and Shackelford, 
2000, among others, segregate firms based on whether they pay dividends. They report 
that the benefits of the TRA cut in capital gains taxes fell disproportionately on non-
dividend-paying firms. They interpret this finding as evidence that TRA affected the 
equity markets because its capital gains tax rate reduction (recall TRA did not alter the 
dividend tax rate) affected all returns of non-dividend-paying stocks, but only some of the 
returns of dividend-paying stocks. As with JGTRRA, we find that dividend policy is 
significant in those TRA regressions where we exclude a measure of financial constraint, 
but insignificant in those where we include a measure of financial constraint. Finding that   5
the degree of financial constraint matters for two different changes in shareholder taxes 
(and that in both cases the decision to issue dividends is irrelevant) provides compelling 
evidence that the elasticity of demand is an important factor in determining the incidence 
of changes in shareholder taxes.    
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we show how the cost of equity 
capital is affected by the firm’s financial constraint when shareholder taxes change. We 
then hypothesize about the relative change in the cost of equity capital for firms with 
different degree of financial constraint. Section 3 describes the research design. Section 4 
presents the findings. Concluding remarks follow.   
  
2.  Hypothesis development 
In a perfect and complete financial market without frictions, such as taxation or 
asymmetric information between firms and investors, the cost of capital (which aids 
managers in determining their demand for capital) and the required expected stock return 
(which aids investors in allocating their supply of capital) should be identical in 
equilibrium. However, in the presence of market frictions, such as taxes, the two 
measures can differ.  
Assuming firms are all-equity financed, Figure 1 shows the relation between the 
cost of equity capital and the required expected return when investment income, such as 
capital gains and dividends, are taxed. The horizontal axis represents the equity capital 
investment and the vertical axis represents the cost of equity capital for firms ( c r ) and the 
required expected rate of return by investors ( r r ). We model firms’ demand for capital 
investment as a decreasing function of the cost of equity capital, i.e.,  0    c r D , and   6
investors’ supply of capital as an increasing function of required expected return by 
investors, i.e.,  0    r r S . To focus on the effect of changes in tax rate, we assume there 
is no asymmetric information.  
To illustrate the effect of taxes on investment income, we start with no taxation of 
investment income. In this case, firms’ demand for capital (D) and investors’ supply of 
capital (S) intersect at point A. The equilibrium cost of capital for firms and the required 




c r r  . 
Next, we introduce shareholder taxes (dividend and/or capital gains taxes) where 
the tax rate is denoted by  . We assume taxes are levied directly on investors and that 
the marginal investors are tax-sensitive. Introducing taxes makes the investors’ effective 
supply of capital likely to shift upward (from S to S’). Assume it shifts upward until the 
firms’ demand for capital and investors’ effective supply of capital intersect at point B. 
At this point, the cost of equity capital paid by firms, denoted by 
B
c r , is no longer the 
same as the required after-tax expected return to investors, denoted 
B B
r c r r ) 1 (    . The 
former is higher than the latter, and the difference is the taxes paid to the government, 




c c r r r     . 
Now suppose taxes on investment income decline (either a reduction in capital 
gains taxes or dividend taxes or both), i.e.,   goes down to '  . The investors’ effective 
supply of capital shifts down toward the no tax case (from S’ to S”), and assume firms’ 
demand for capital and investors’ supply of capital now intersect at point C. At the new 
equilibrium, the cost of equity capital for firms still exceeds the investors’ required after-
tax expected rate of return on equity investment, i.e., 
C C
c r r r  . However, following the   7
reduction in investment income taxes, the new equilibrium cost of equity capital for firms 
is lower and the equilibrium after-tax expected return for investors is higher.  
Furthermore, the reduction of cost of capital is larger for firms whose demand 
elasticity is low (in magnitude). Figure 2 adds a second firm with lower demand elasticity 
whose demand for capital is labeled as D’. Suppose that before the tax cut, both firms’ 
demand interacts with supply S’ at point B. After the tax cut, when the effective supply 
becomes S”, the first firm moves from point B to points C (as seen in Figure 1), but the 
second firm moves from point B to point C’. Note that the reduction in cost of capital is 
larger for the second firm than for the first firm (
B
c r to 
' C




c r ). This leads us to 
infer that, since firms facing more severe financial constraint are the ones that have lower 
elasticity of demand for capital, these firms will see larger reductions in the cost of equity 
capital, when shareholder taxes are cut, than will firms with higher elasticity of demand 
for capital, i.e., firms that face less financial constraint.
5 This leads to the paper’s 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis: A reduction in shareholder tax rates will decrease the cost of equity capital 




                                                 
5 Consider two extreme cases: (1) the firm is completely constrained with no access to external capital, and 
(2) the firm is completely unconstrained in its access to external capital. In the first case, the firm’s demand 
elasticity for external capital is zero because a change in the cost of equity capital has no effect on the 
amount of capital it can raise. In the second case, the firm’s demand for external capital is very elastic 
because it can access the external market any time and will only choose to raise external capital when the 
cost of equity capital is low and refrain from using external capital when the cost of capital is high. Thus, a 
small increase in the cost of capital may have a large impact on the amount of external capital raised by the 
firm, leading to a high elasticity of demand for external capital. 
   8
3.  Research design 
3.1. Research equation 
To assess whether financial constraint affects the impact of a change in 
shareholder taxes on a firm’s cost of equity capital, we expand DKL’s regression 
equation by adding a measure of financial constraint and several macroeconomic 
controls.
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     

                (1) 
where  it r ˆ is the measure of estimated cost of equity capital,  t Post is a dummy variable 
which takes a value of zero before the tax cut and one after the tax cut,  1  it FC  is the 
measure for financial constraint of firm i at time t-1, and  1  it INST measures the percentage 
of institutional ownership of firm i at time t-1.
7  it X represents the firm level control 
variables, and  t Z  represents aggregate variables to control for the overall economic 
                                                 
6 To the extent possible, we follow DKL throughout the paper. By building off the prior literature, we 
enhance our ability to isolate the impact of financial constraint on the cost of equity capital when 
shareholder taxes change. 
7 To capture different tax sensitivity of investor ownership to shareholder taxes, we construct proxies for 
the percentage of investor ownership of a stock (individual investors and institutional investors) using data 
on shares outstanding and shares owned by different types of institutional investors. The data on the 
institutional investors’ ownership are obtained from their quarterly filings with the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (known as Form 13F) compiled by Thomson’s Financial. This control is important 
because the tax rate reductions in this study only apply to income that is reported on personal tax returns, 
i.e., dividends received and capital gains from the selling of shares held directly by individuals or held 
indirectly by individuals in flow-through entities, such as mutual funds, partnerships, trusts, S corporations, 
or limited liability corporations that pass dividend income to investors’ personal tax returns.  The rate 
reductions do not apply to dividend and capital gain income for shares held by tax-deferred accounts (e.g., 
qualified retirement plans, including pensions, IRAs and 401(k)), tax-exempt organizations, corporations, 
and foreigners, among other non-individual shareholders. As discussed below, we recognize that this 
measure is not without controversy (see Guenther and Sansing, 2006, 2010). However, we use this measure 
because DKL did so. By using it, rather than some other potentially superior measure, we retain the ability 
to identify any departures in our findings from those in DKL.   9
activities.
8 The variable of interest is the interaction term,  1   it t FC Post . We will interpret 
a negative coefficient on  3   as evidence that firms with more severe financial constraint 
(or inelastic demand for capital) experience a larger reduction in the cost of capital than 
other companies do, following a reduction in shareholder taxes.  
We use the same firm level controls that DKL do: the book value-to-market value 
ratio (in logarithm), forecasted long-term growth of earnings, the coefficient of variation 
of the one-year-ahead earnings per share forecast, the average cost of equity capital over 
the sample period for each industry using the classification by Fama and French (1997), 
firm size (in logarithm) in the most recent past quarter, and risk exposures to the market, 
the size, and the value factors measured by  , MKT  , SMB   and  . HML   Following DKL, we 
estimate these risk factor loadings using return data for the 48 months before the 
beginning of the calendar year. We also include the moving average daily turnover for 
each firm over past 250 days leading up to the end of the most recent past quarter.  
In addition, since macroeconomic activities may influence firms’ demand for 
capital and investors’ supply of capital, we add macroeconomic and aggregate financial 
variables, such as detrended risk-free rate (Campbell and Shiller, 1988), excess market 
return and its volatility, industrial production growth rate, and the consumption-wealth 
ratio (CAY) following Lettau and Ludvigson (2001).
9 In every regression, we also include 
quarterly dummy variables to control for possible seasonal effect. 
                                                 
8 In the regression analysis, we use the PROC MIXED Procedure to estimate our panel model specification. 
Our estimation method utilizes the clustered estimate for the standard errors which allow for both cross-
sectional and serial correlation. 
9 For the risk-free rate, we use the three month Treasury bill rate from Ken French’s website and 
stochastically detrend the variable by removing the prior twelve month average as done in Campbell and 
Shiller (1988). Stock market return is measured by the excess return on the value-weighted portfolio of 
stocks included in the CRSP database. The growth rate of the industrial production is calculated using   10
 
3.2. Cost of equity capital measure 
Following Dhaliwal el al., (2005, 2006, 2007), among others, we estimate ex ante 
or implied cost of equity capital using various versions of the residual income model 
(Ohlson, 1995, Feltham and Ohlson, 1995). Under the assumption of clean surplus 
accounting on a firm’s earnings and book value of equity, the dividend discount model 















i t e i t t
t t r
B r NI E
B P                    (2) 
where  t P  is the stock price at the end of period t,  t B  is the firm’s book value at time t, 
i t NI   is the firm’s net income for period t+i, and  e r  is the firm’s implied cost of equity 
capital. ] [ 1     i t e i t t B r NI E  is the abnormal earnings in excess of the cost of equity on the 
firm’s book value and thus represents the time t expected value of the residual income at 
time t+i.  Following DKL, we use their three different variations of the residual income 
model to estimate the implied cost of equity capital: Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan 
(2001), Claus and Thomas (2001), and Gode and Mohanram (2003). The appendix 
reviews the computation of these three estimates. 
We find that inferences are generally the same with each of the three measures. 
Therefore, since each estimate has its advantages and disadvantages depending on firm 
and time period, we use the mean of the three estimates as our primary estimate of the 
                                                                                                                                                   
monthly industrial production index obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The 
consumption-wealth ratio, CAY, is downloaded from Martin Lettau’s website.  
   11
cost of equity capital. Using the mean should reduce any estimation noise embedded in 
each estimate and, thus, provide a more reliable estimate of the cost of equity capital.  
 
3.3. Financial constraint measure 
We estimate a firm’s financial constraint based on the latest measure developed 
by Hadlock and Pierce (2010).
10 Analyzing 1,848 firm-years from 1995 to 2004 for 356 
randomly selected firms in Compustat, they use an elaborate process to classify the 
financial constraint for each firm-year from 1-5, where 5 represents the most financially 
constrained firms. They then regress their financial constraint value for each firm-year on 
various potential determinants of financial constraint as identified in extant papers. The 
result is an ordered LOGIT model with four variables deemed relevant for classification: 
(a) Cash Flow: a firm’s operating income plus depreciation divided by beginning-of-year 
book assets; (b) Leverage: book value of long term debt divided by current book assets; 
(c) Size: log of inflation-adjusted assets; and (d) Firm Age: the current year minus the 
first year that the firm has an non-missing stock price on Compustat.
11 
Using the estimated coefficients for the four variables and the cut points for the 
five classifications of financial constraint, we can estimate the probability that firm i falls 
into each of the five groups at time t. We then take the predicted probability of firm i 
falling into group 5 (i.e., the group with the most financially constrained firms) at time t 
                                                 
10 Other candidates for measuring financial constraint include the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index, which 
amalgamates cash flow, Tobin’s Q, leverage, dividends and cash holding scaled by book value of assets 
and the Whited and Wu (2006) index, which integrates cash flow, a dividend distribution dummy, leverage, 
size, industry sales growth, and firm sales growth. As pointed out by Hadlock and Pierce (2010), some of 
determinants used in Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Whited and Wu (2006) may be endogenously 
determined with the measure of financial constraint faced by a firm and sometimes have conflicting signs. 
Thus, they are not suitable as determinants of a firm’s financial constraint measure. 
11 Hadlock and Pierce (2010) show that similar financial constraint classifications can be derived using only 
firm size and age. In Section 4.6, we replicate the empirical tests in the study using this alternative measure, 
and, not surprising, inferences are largely unaltered.   12
as the measure of firm i’s financial constraint at time t.  This probability is our primary 
measure of financial constraint and is termed FCit. Specifically, we estimate the 
probability of financial constraint for firm i at period t as follows: 
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where C4 is the cut point for group four (likely financial constrained) and the associated 
cut points for groups 1 to 4 are estimated at -4.191, 0.208, 1.494, and 1.554, respectively. 
All four estimated coefficients have consistent signs and are statistically significant at 1% 
level.
12  
Hadlock and Pierce’s (2010) financial constraint classification process supersedes 
its predecessors for at least two reasons. First, it uses qualitative information to categorize 
a firm’s financial constraint status by carefully reading statements made by managers in 
SEC filings such as the annual letter to shareholders and the management discussion and 
analysis section. Second, the sampling period for Hadlock and Pierce (2010) covers both 
of the two changes in shareholder taxes that we examine in this study. This facilitates the 
use of their coefficient estimates in computing the probability of financial constraint for 
firms in our sample. 
 
3.4. Events 
DKL limit their analysis of the impact of shareholder taxes on the cost of equity 
capital to the latest change in the U.S. shareholder tax law (Jobs and Growth Tax Relief 
                                                 
12 These estimates are taken from Column (4) of Table 4 in Hadlock and Pierce (2010) and we thank Joshua 
Pierce for providing us the cut point estimates.   13
Reconciliation Act of 2003 or JGTRRA), which dropped the maximum, statutory tax rate 
on dividends from 38.6% to 15% and the maximum, statutory tax rate on realized capital 
gains from 20% to 15% for positions held at least 12 months. We test our hypothesis on 
both JGTRRA and the change in the shareholder tax law that preceded it, the Taxpayer 
Relief Act of 1997 (TRA), which left the dividend tax rate unchanged but reduced the 
maximum, statutory tax rate on realized capital gains from 28% to 20% for positions held 
more than 18 months.  
For TRA, we use data from the first quarter of 1995 to the fourth quarter of 1998. 
The categorical variable Post takes a value of zero on and before 3/31/1997 and value of 
one on and after 7/1/1997. For JGTRRA, we use data from the first quarter of 2001 to the 
fourth quarter of 2004. The categorical variable Post takes a value of zero on and before 
3/31/2003 and value of one on and after 7/1/2003. We exclude the “announcement” 
months (coincidentally April to June for both legislations) from our examination to 
mitigate possible transient effects arising from uncertainty about passage of the tax 
legislation. Results are similar if we include the transitional periods. 
 
4.  Results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for firm level variables. Panel A reports 
the mean, median, and standard deviation for the full sample from 1995Q1 to 1998Q4 for 
TRA and from 2001Q1 to 2004Q4 for JGTRRA. The mean (median) cost of equity 
capital is 9.7% (9.1%) with a standard deviation of 4.0% for TRA and 8.9% (8.4%) with 
a standard deviation of 3.4% for JGTRRA. The mean estimated probability of a firm   14
facing financial constraint (FC) is 4.4% with a standard deviation of 4.1% during TRA 
and 3.4% with a standard deviation of 3.2% around JGTRRA. On average, about 29% of 
shares owned by institutional investors during TRA and 36% during JGTRRA. The 
moving average daily turnover for the past 250 days has a mean of 0.0031 (0.0041) with 
a standard deviation of 0.0030 (0.0052) for TRA (JGTRRA). The book-to-market value 
is on average higher during JGTRRA than during TRA. The average long-term growth of 
earnings and the dispersion of earnings forecasts are slightly lower around JGTRRA than 
around TRA. Not surprisingly, firms were larger in 2003 than in 1997. The mean firm 
exposure to the size factor declined (from 0.85 during TRA to 0.43 during JGTRRA), but 
the exposure to the value factor increased (from 0.15 during TRA to 0.39 during 
JGTRRA).     
Panel B of Table 1 reports the averages for these firm level variables before and 
after the tax cut for both the TRA and the JGTRRA. All firm variables experienced 
changes in their sample means that are significant at the 10% level, except for the average 
exposure to the size factor under TRA. Of particular interest to this study, the estimated 
average cost of equity capital (rAVE) for both TRA and JGTRRA is lower after the tax cut 
than before the tax cut at the 1% level. The reduction is larger in magnitude under 
JGTRRA (from 0.095 to 0.083) than under TRA (from 0.097 to 0.096). Each of the three 
estimates of the cost of equity capital (rGLS, rCT, and rGM) shows similar declines. The 
mean probability of firms facing financial constraint is slightly lower after TRA (from 
4.47% to 4.4%), significant at 10%, but more so after JGTRRA (from 3.61% to 3.04%), 
significant at 1%.       15
Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the macroeconomic variables. The 
stochastically detrended monthly risk-free rate has an average of -0.013 (-0.062) for TRA 
(JGTRRA). The monthly average market excess return is 0.048 (0.016) for TRA 
(JGTRRA). The monthly average market return volatility is 0.035 (0.045) during TRA 
(JGTRRA). The monthly average industrial production growth rate is 0.008 (0.001) for 
TRA (JGTRRA). The average consumption-wealth ratio is 0.014 (-0.007) for TRA 
(JGTRRA). Panel B shows that the macroeconomic variables before and after the tax 
cuts. The statistics suggest that overall economic environment experienced more 
significant changes during JGTRRA than TRA. 
 
4.2. Univariate tests 
Table 3, Panel A reports the findings from our initial test of the hypothesis. We 
dichotomize the sample into high (HFC) and low (LFC) financially constrained firms and 
then compare their costs of capital in the quarter immediately before the tax cuts with the 
costs of capital in the quarter immediately afterwards. A firm is classified as having high 
(low) financial constraint if its probability of financial constraint in the quarter 
immediately preceding the tax rate cut is above (below) the median probability for all 
firms. For completeness, Table 3, Panel A presents the results using each of the three 
measures of the cost of equity capital (rGLS, rCT, and rGM), but, for brevity, we mostly 
limit our discussion to the average of these three measures (rAVE) since inferences are by 
and large the same for each measure.  
Consistent with extant studies that report a reduction in the cost of equity capital 
following a reduction in shareholder taxes, we find that after TRA the average cost of   16
equity capital decreased from 0.110 to 0.094 for the more financially constrained firms 
and from 0.087 to 0.078 for less financially constrained firm group. Following JGTRRA, 
the average cost of equity capital decreased from 0.099 to 0.083 for HFC companies and 
from 0.094 to 0.082 for LFC firms. All decreases are significant at the 1% level.  
More importantly for this study, the reductions in the average cost of equity 
capital were larger for the firms facing a higher probability of financial constraint than for 
the group facing a lower probability of financial constraint. For TRA, the reduction in the 
average cost of equity capital is 0.0160 for the HFC firms and 0.0089 for the LFC group. 
The difference between the two groups is 72 basis points and significant at 1% level. For 
JGTRRA, the reduction is 0.0159 for the high financially constrained group and 0.0116 
for the low financially constrained group, a difference of 43 basis points, which is also 
significant at 1% level.     
Since firms facing binding financial constraint are less likely to pay dividends, we 
next partition the sample into dividend-paying and non-dividend-paying subsamples and 
repeat the difference-in-difference comparison. Table 3, Panel B presents the results.  
After TRA, we find that HFC firms enjoyed a significantly larger reduction in 
their cost of equity capital than did LFC firms for both the dividend-paying subsample 
and the non-dividend-paying subsample. Furthermore, the difference-in-differences for 
the non-dividend-paying firms (62 basis points) exceeds the difference-in-differences for 
dividend-paying firms (45 basis points) and the difference is statistically significant at the 
5% level.  
After JGTRRA, we find that only HFC firms in the non-dividend-paying 
subsample enjoy a significantly larger reduction in their cost of equity capital than did   17
LFC firms. The difference between HFC and LFC companies for the dividend-paying 
subsample is insignificant. In addition, the difference-in-differences for the non-dividend-
paying firms (48 basis points) exceeds the difference-in-differences for the dividend-
paying firms (10 basis points) and the difference is statistically significant at the 5% 
level.   
To summarize, consistent with prior research, we find that the cost of equity 
capital fell after shareholder tax cuts. However, to our knowledge, this is the first paper to 
show that the decrease in the cost of equity capital varied with the firm’s degree of 
financial constraint. Furthermore, we find that the decreases were greater for non-
dividend-paying firms than for dividend-paying firms, consistent with the former 
exhibiting lower demand for external capital. These dividend policy distinctions 
potentially provide at least a partial solution to the DKL puzzle about why stock prices 
rose more for non-dividend-paying firms than for dividend-paying firms after JGTRRA. 
What the extant studies identified as dividend policy distinctions may have been partially 
due to differences in financial constraint that were not considered, i.e., an omitted 
correlated variable in their analyses. We now move from univariate tests to multivariate 
panel regression analyses.    
 
4.3. Primary regression results 
Table 4 reports panel regression results from estimating equation (1). As 
expected, the estimated regression coefficient on the interaction term,  FC Post , is 
negative and significant at 1% level for both TRA and JGTRRA. The results are 
consistent with the decline in the cost of equity capital, following a reduction in   18
shareholder taxes, being greater for those firms facing the most stringent financial 
constraint. The estimated coefficients suggest that for a one standard deviation increase in 
the probability of financial constraint faced by a firm, the reduction of the cost of equity 
capital will be larger by 36 basis points under the TRA ( 041 . 0 088 . 0  ) and by 38 basis 
points under the JGTRRA ( 032 . 0 119 . 0  ).  
Furthermore, including the financial constraint measures in the model reduces the 
coefficients on Post, leaving only the TRA one significant. The failure to find a 
significant coefficient on Post in the JGTRRA regression is consistent with cross-
sectional variation in financial constraint explaining DKL’s finding that the cost of equity 
capital declined after JGTRRA.
13 
Turning to two other variables of interest, we find that the estimated regression 
coefficients for the variable FC are positive and significant at 1%, consistent with 
financially constrained firms facing higher costs of equity capital before the two tax cuts. 
This result is not surprising, but it does provide some comfort that our measure of 
financial constraint is capturing an important factor that increases the cost of equity 
capital. Likewise, we find the coefficient estimates on  INST Post   are positive and 
significant at 1% for both TRA and JGTRRA, which is consistent with the finding in 
DKL. This result suggests that firms with higher institutional ownership experience a 
smaller reduction in the cost of equity capital, which is not surprising because the tax rate 
cuts for both TRA and JGTRRA only applied to taxable individual investors.  
 
 
                                                 
13 When we exclude our measures of financial constraint, FC and PostFC, from the regression, the 
coefficient on  Post  is negative and significantly less than zero at the 1% (5%) level for TRA (JGTRRA).   19
4.4. Dividend policy—JGTRRA puzzle 
As discussed above, existing JGTRRA studies (e.g., DKL and Auerbach and 
Hassett, 2006) document a puzzling result: The stock prices of non-dividend-paying firms 
outperformed dividend-paying firms around JGTRRA, despite the fact that (a) the 
dividend-paying stocks benefited immediately from the reductions in both capital gains 
taxes and dividend taxes, while the non-dividend-paying firms only benefited from the 
capital gains tax cut and (b) the dividend rate reductions (23.6 percentage points) far 
exceeded the capital gains tax rate reductions (five percentage points).
  
We advance a possible explanation for this puzzle. Ceteris paribus, dividend-
paying firms are less financially constrained than non-dividend-paying firms. In fact, 
issuing dividends is prima facie evidence that the firm has excess capital, which enables 
it to pay dividends. Thus, it is possible that the cost of capital response appears to vary 
with the decision choice because dividend policy is closely related to financial 
constraint.
14 To test this proposition, we estimate the following specification: 
                                                 
14 Auerbach and Hassett (2006) advance another reason why the results may not be puzzling. If managers 
and investors perceived that the tax cuts would be made permanent, then “immature” companies whose 
dividend payments lie solely in the future might have benefited more than dividend payers, which had 
distributed part of their profits when dividend taxes were higher. Even though the rate cuts have persisted 
until now, permanence would have seemed to be a risky assumption in 2003 for at least four reasons. The 
cuts barely passed a Republican Congress with Vice-President Cheney casting the tie-breaking vote; they 
were set to sunset in five years; the 2004 Democratic Presidential candidate John Kerry, who was narrowly 
defeated, had pledged to repeal the shareholder tax cuts, if elected, and the legislation’s projected loss in 
tax revenues was (and remains) substantial, making it a likely prospect for subsequent tax increases. 
Subsequent distribution patterns provide mixed evidence about the perceptions of managers and investors. 
Chetty and Saez (2005) and Brown et al., (2007) report that an inordinate number of firms with large 
insider ownership initiated ordinary dividends soon as passage of JGTRRA, suggesting that they viewed 
the cuts as temporary. However, yields were low, implying they had plenty of time to distribute at the lower 
rates. Shackelford (2009) claims that, despite Microsoft’s extraordinary 2004 special dividend of $32 
billion, few firms opted for special dividends, even though special dividends enable firms to make large 
distributions and avoid the expectations for continued payment associated with ordinary dividends. This 
may be consistent with permanence because firms forwent an opportunity to enjoy the tax benefits 
immediately. Blouin et al. (2011) report that dividend-paying firms increased their repurchases more than 
their ordinary dividends, perhaps inconsistent with permanence if these firms feared the need to recede 
increased ordinary dividends if rates sunset. Unable to measure market perceptions about the permanence 
of the rate reductions, we do not address the Auerbach and Hassett’s (2006) conjecture in our tests.   20
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where NDivit represents a non-dividend-paying dummy that equals one if firm i does not 
pays dividend in quarter t and zero otherwise, HYit is one if firm i’s dividend yield is 
above the median dividend yield in that quarter and zero otherwise.
15 For both TRA and 
JGTRRA, we estimate the model with and without the financial constraint variable to 
assess the effect of financial constraint on the cost of capital for firms with different 
dividend policy.  
Although the puzzle was raised in JGTRRA work, several studies of TRA (e.g., 
Blouin et al., 2009, Dai et al., 2008, and Lang and Shackelford, 2000) may suffer from 
the same misidentification of dividend policy as a determinant of the impact of a change 
in shareholder taxes. These studies find that, after the TRA cut in capital gains tax rates, 
the equity markets responded more strongly for non-dividend-paying firms than for 
dividend-paying firms. These findings are interpreted as evidence that the tax cut 
mattered because all returns for non-dividend-paying firms were affected by the capital 
gains tax rate reduction, while some returns of the dividend-paying firms remained 
subject to the unchanged dividend tax rate. However, if the decision to issue dividends is 
actually a proxy for financial constraint, then these studies may have misestimated the 
impact of TRA, in particular, understating its effect of TRA for financially constrained, 
dividend-paying firms and overstating its effect on less constrained, non-dividend-paying 
firms.   
                                                 
15 We include HYit as a control variable because both DKL and Auerbach and Hassett (2006) document that 
the impact of JGTRRA on the cost of capital for dividend-paying firms is increasing in their dividend yield. 
This is not surprising since the large dividend tax cut should expect benefit high-yield firms more than low-
yield firms. Including a categorical variable for yield enables us to compare those firms that issue dividends 
with those that do not, conditional on the known variation among dividend-paying firms.   21
  Table 5 presents findings that are consistent with prior TRA and JGTRRA studies 
misidentifying variation in financial constraint as differences in dividend policy. We find 
that when the financial constraint variable is excluded, non-dividend paying firms 
experience a larger reduction in the cost of capital than dividend-paying firms (as 
indicated by the significant negative coefficient for Post×NDiv) for both TRA and 
JGTRRA. However, after controlling for financial constraint, non-dividend paying firms 
no longer experience a larger reduction in the cost of capital than dividend-paying firms 
(as indicated by the insignificant coefficient for Post×NDiv). Meanwhile, the coefficient 
on Post×FC is negative and significant at the 1% level, consistent with the cost of capital 
moving inversely with financial constraint. These findings suggest that the prior studies, 
which report that changes in shareholder taxes vary with whether a firm pays dividends, 
suffer from an omitted, correlated variable, which is the extent to which a firm faces 
financial constraint.  In other words, financial constraint matters, not the decision to pay 
dividends.  
As noted above, we control for dividend yield because both DKL and Auerbach 
and Hassett (2006) report that firms with high dividend yield outperformed firms with 
low dividend yield. Consistent with their findings, we find that the coefficient on 
Post×HY is negative and significant at the 1% level in the JGTRRA test, both when we 
include and exclude our measures of financial constraint. This implies that the added 
benefits from the dividend tax cuts for high-yield issuers overwhelmed differences, if 
any, in the inelasticity of demand for capital among dividend issuers.  
 
   22
4.5. Tax status of shareholders 
Next, we look at differences in the taxable status of a firm’s shareholders. As 
mentioned above, TRA and JGTRRA only apply to returns that are reported on personal 
tax returns. While controversy remains about whether the marginal investor is a taxable 
investor, numerous empirical studies document that investor tax characteristics affect 
asset returns and trading volume.
16 If the marginal investor is not an American individual 
subject to capital gains taxation, then individual shareholder tax cuts should have no 
direct effect on the cost of equity capital even for firms facing financial constraint. 
Consistent with the marginal investor being an American individual, DKL show that 
firms with higher tax sensitive investor ownership enjoyed a larger reduction in their cost 
of capital during JGTRRA.  
We extend their analysis to see whether the impact of financial constraint varied 
with the tax sensitivity of investor ownership for both TRA and JGTRRA, in particular, 
whether the reduction in the cost of equity capital is larger for financially constrained 
stocks with higher tax sensitivity. We use the following empirical specification to test the 
effect of tax sensitivity on the changes in the cost of equity capital of firms facing 
different probability of financial constraint: 
                                                 
16 A host of empirical papers, besides DKL, finds that the extent of institutional ownership (measured in 
various ways) is a useful proxy for the probability that the marginal investor is tax-advantaged. For 
examples, see Sias and Starks (1997), Gompers and Metrick (2001), Ayers et al., (2002, 2003), Blouin et 
al., (2003, 2011), Jin (2006), Dhaliwal and Li (2006), and Dai et al., (2008), among others. Nonetheless, 
this measure is not without controversy. In an equilibrium model, Guenther and Sansing (2006) show that 
the dividend tax premium should not vary with the mix of taxable and tax-exempt investors. Guenther and 
Sansing (2010) report that the percentage of shares held by tax-exempt investors captures factors other than 
differences in taxation, including differences in the relative risk tolerance of taxable investors, the riskiness 
of each stock, and the stock’s dividend yield. We follow prior studies in using a stock’s institutional 
ownership to measure its shareholders’ sensitivity to individual taxes. We trust that the deleterious effects 
of any measurement error are mitigated since we only use institutional holdings to split the sample in half 
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where  HINDit ( LINDit) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if  firm i’s 
individual investor ownership at time period t is above (below) the median individual 
investor ownership for all firms in period t. If the reduction in the cost of equity capital 
for more financially constrained firms is larger for high tax sensitive investor ownership 
than for low tax sensitive investor ownership, then the coefficient on 
HFC HIND Post    should be more negative than the coefficient on 
HFC LIND Post   .  
Table 6 presents the results of our panel regression analysis. Consistent with HFC 
firms experiencing greater reductions in their cost of equity capital, the coefficients for 
both  HFC HIND Post    and  HFC LIND Post    are negative and significant at 1% 
level under both TRA and JGTRRA. We also find that the coefficients on 
HFC HIND Post    are more negative than the coefficients on  HFC LIND Post    and 
significantly less at the 10% level for JGTRRA. These findings are consistent with the 
tax-driven reductions in the cost of equity capital varying both with the level of financial 
constraint and with the level of individual investor ownership. In other words, the firms 
whose cost of equity market was reduced the most by the shareholder tax cuts were 
financially constrained firms held disproportionately by individual U.S. investors. 
  
4.6. Alternative measure of financial constraint 
Finally, we check whether the results in this study are robust to an alternative 
estimate of the probability of financial constraint faced by firms. As discussed above,   24
several methods for measuring financial constraint exist. The tests detailed above use the 
latest Hadlock and Pierce (2010) measure based on leverage, cash flow, size and age. 
Hadlock and Pierce (2010) also suggest a measure based solely on firm size and age, 
arguing that leverage and cash flow may be endogenous. Specifically, after extensive 
empirical investigation, they arrive at the following ordered LOGIT specification which 
allows us to compute the probability of financial constraint for firm i at period t:   
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where SA Indexit refers to the probability of financial constraint that only uses firm size 
and age, and C4 is the cumulative cut point for group four (likely financially constrained). 
We estimated the average firms’ probability of financial constraint is 0.042 with a 
standard deviation of 0.037 during TRA and is 0.032 with a standard deviation of 0.029 
for the period surrounding JGTRRA. Both are comparable to the estimates obtained from 
using four variables (cash flow, leverage, size, and age) on the specification of equation 
(3).  
Using this alternative measure of financial constraint we repeat all of the tests 
discussed above. Results are qualitatively the same with one exception detailed below. In 
general, we continue to find strong evidence that a firm’s financial constraint is an 
important determinant of the impact of shareholder tax changes on its cost of equity 
capital.  
The first two columns in Table 7 present the results from estimating equation (1) 
with the alternative measure of financial constraint (SA Index). The coefficients on 
Post×SA Index are negative and highly significant, indicating that, after passage of the   25
tax cuts, the benefits of the shareholder tax rate reductions were increasing in the firm’s 
inelasticity of demand, as measured with Hadlock and Pierce’s (2010) alternative 
approach.  The middle two columns present the results from estimating equation (4) with 
the alternative measure. Here, the findings are mixed. As with the original financial 
constraint measure, the JGTRRA results in column 4 show that it was the financially 
constrained firms that enjoyed a drop in the cost of capital following enactment, not the 
non-dividend-paying firms, as prior studies had suggested.  Conversely, the TRA results 
in column 3 differ from the original findings. The coefficient on Post×SA Index  is 
insignificant, while the coefficient on Post×NDiv is significant at 10%, raising doubts 
about whether the inferences drawn above about financial constraint and dividend policy 
apply to TRA. Finally, the last two columns present the findings from estimating 
equation (5) with the alternative financial constraint measure. Once again, we find that 
the coefficients on  HFC HIND Post    are more negative than the coefficients on 
HFC LIND Post    at 5% level for both TRA and JGTRRA, consistent with the 
incidence of the tax reduction falling on financially constrained companies held 
disproportionately by U.S. individuals. Together, these results show that the inferences 
drawn earlier in the paper are largely robust to this alternative specification of the 
financial constraint measure. 
  
5.   Conclusions  
We provide the first empirical investigation of the effects of financial constraint 
on the impact of shareholder taxes on a firm’s cost of equity capital. Theory suggests that 
reductions in shareholder taxes should decrease the cost of equity capital. This reduction   26
should be larger for firms with more inelastic demand for capital, i.e., firms facing more 
severe financial constraint. Consistent with these predictions, we find that financially 
constrained firms, and particularly those held disproportionately by U.S. individuals, 
experienced a larger decrease in their cost of equity capital than did other companies 
following enactment of the 1997 and 2003 shareholder tax rate reductions. Consequently, 
to the extent that those tax cuts were designed to enable firms with the most pressing 
needs for equity to better access the external capital markets, the findings in this paper 
would suggest that the legislations succeeded.  
The findings in this paper also shed light on a puzzle that has eluded researchers 
to date. During the JGTRRA legislative deliberations, the share prices of non-dividend-
paying firms outperformed those of dividend-paying firms even though the legislation 
slashed dividend tax rates by 23.6 percentage points compared with a relatively modest 5 
percentage point cut in capital gains tax rates. We find that the prior studies suffer from 
the omission of a variable that is correlated with the decision to issue dividends, namely 
the extent to which firms are financially constrained. When we include measures of both 
dividend status and financial constraint in the regression model, we find that the prior 
significance on the dividend variable goes away, while the financial constraint measure is 
highly significant. Thus, the puzzle appears at least partially solved. Non-dividend-
paying firms did not benefit disproportionately from the 2003 tax rate reductions. Rather, 
it was the financially constrained firms (many of which do not issue dividends) that 
benefited the most.    27
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Appendix 
This appendix reviews the computations of the three estimates of a firm’s implied cost of 
equity capital used in this study: 
A.  Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan Model (GLS) 
Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001) use the following equation to estimate a 
firm’s implied cost of equity: 
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                (A1) 
where  t B  is the firm’s per share book value at the beginning of time t,  i t FROE   is 
forecasted return on equity (ROE) for period t+i, i.e.,  2 , 1 , / 1       i B FEPS FROE i t i t i t , 
and  i t FEPS   is the I/B/E/S 1- and 2- year-ahead earnings per share forecast, TV  is the 
terminal value calculated according to 
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TV                (A2) 
where the forecasted ROE for period t+3 is calculated using the I/B/E/S analyst 2-year-
ahead earnings per share forecast multiplied by the I/B/E/S analysts’ consensus long-term 
growth rate, the forecasted ROE for periods beyond t+3 is calculated using the linear 
interpolation procedure to the industry median ROE proposed by GLS,  i t B   is calculated 
according to the clean surplus accounting as  , 1 i t i t i t FDPS FEPS B        where  i t FDPS   
is forecasted dividends per share, which is equal to forecasted earnings per share for 
period t+i multiplied by the year t dividend payout ratio. Following GLS and Dhaliwal, 
et al (2005, 2006, and 2007), we calculate the implied cost of equity capital for T=12. 
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B.  Claus and Thomas Model (CT) 
Claus and Thomas (2001) use the following equation to estimate the implied cost 
of equity capital: 
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         (A3) 
where  1       i t e i t i t B r FEPS AE  is the expected abnormal earnings for period t+i. 
Following Dhaliwal, et al (2005, 2006, and 2007), when I/B/E/S earnings forecast is 
unavailable, we use FEPS for the prior year multiplied by one plus the I/B/E/S consensus 
long-term growth forecast,  ae g  is the growth rate of abnormal earnings beyond period 
t+5 and is set to equal to the yield on 10-year U.S. treasury bonds minus three percentage 
points as in DKL. 
 
C.  Gode and Mohanram Model (GM) 
Gode and Mohanram (2003) use the following formula to estimate the cost of 
equity capital: 
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where  2 / ] / ) 03 . 0 [( 1 t t f P FDPS r A      and  2 g is set equal to the I/B/E/S consensus 
long-term growth forecast when available and equal to  ) 1 / ( 1 2    t t FEPS FEPS  when the 
consensus growth forecast is unavailable,  1  t FDPS  is the forecasted per share dividends 
calculated as forecasted per share earnings at time t+1 multiplied by dividend payout 





Cost of Equity Capital and Shareholder Taxes 
 
This figure illustrates the effect of shareholder tax rate change on the firm’s cost of 
capital. Without shareholder taxation, in equilibrium, the cost of capital and the required 
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Cost of Equity Capital and Shareholder Taxes for Different Firms 
 
This figure illustrates the effect of a shareholder tax rate change on the cost of capital for 
firms with different demand elasticity. Suppose the second firm with less elastic demand 
for capital (labeled as D’) also has equilibrium at point B before the tax cut. The new 
equilibrium after the tax cut will be at point C’ for this second firm and C for the first 
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Table 1 Summary statistics – firm level variables 
 
This table reposts summary statistics for firm characteristics for the period surrounding TRA and 
JGTRRA for the full sample (Panel A) and the pre- and post- subsamples (Panel B). rGLS, rCT, rGM 
and rAVE are the cost of capital estimated using methods by Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan 
(2001), Claus and Thomas (2001), and Gode and Mohanram (2003) and the average of the above 
three respectively; FC is the predicted probability of a firm being financially constrained in 
quarter t using Hadlock and Pierce (2010) method; INST  is the percentage ownership by 
institutional investors; Turnover is the moving average of the past 250 daily volume scaled by 
the shares outstanding; LogBM  is the logarithm of the book-to-market ratio; LogLTG  is the 
logarithm of the forecasted long-term earnings growth rate; LogDisp is the logarithm of the 
dispersion of the forecasted long-term growth rate; ri is the industry average cost of capital for 48 
industries classified according to Fama and French (1997); LogSize is the logarithm of a firm’s 
market capitalization; βmkt,  βsmb, and βhml are the beta coefficient relative to the market, the SMB, 
and the HML factor, respectively. The sample spans 1995Q1 to 1998Q4 for TRA and 2001Q1 to 
2004Q4 for JGTRRA.   
 
 
Panel A: full sample 
        TRA           JGTRRA 
  Mean  Median Std Dev Mean Median  Std Dev
    
rAVE  0.0966 0.0907 0.0402 0.0893 0.0837  0.0344
rGLS  0.0843 0.0827 0.0343 0.0839 0.0811  0.0324
rCT  0.1014 0.0904 0.0634 0.0895 0.0796  0.0555
rGM  0.1047 0.0985 0.0430 0.0947 0.0901  0.0380
FC  0.0444 0.0330 0.0412 0.0340 0.0251  0.0316
Yield  0.0199 0.0000 0.0341 0.0228 0.0037  0.0370
INST  0.2866 0.2219 0.2466 0.3561 0.2988  0.2924
Turnover  0.0031 0.0022 0.0030 0.0041 0.0024  0.0052
LogBM  -0.6719 -0.6568 1.0248 -0.3687 -0.4934 1.2377
LogLTG  2.8625 2.8261 0.6514 2.7703 2.7081  0.6525
LogDisp  -3.0820 -3.2387 1.1467 -3.2613 -3.4340 1.2503
ri  0.0964 0.0958 0.0110 0.0904 0.0892  0.0117
LogSize  4.7829 4.6593 1.8613 5.2070 5.1185  2.0293
βmkt  0.9360 0.8615 1.1688 0.9902 0.8818  0.9157
βsmb  0.8499 0.6468 1.5019 0.6052 0.4275  0.9202
βhml  0.1473 0.2838 1.7991 0.1926 0.3857  1.1876
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Panel B: pre- vs. post 
 TRA JGTRRA 
  Pre      Post  Pr(diff=0) Pre       Post  Pr(diff=0)
    
rAVE  0.0974 0.0956 <.0001 0.0945 0.0827  <.0001
rGLS  0.0848 0.0837 <.0001 0.0882 0.0780  <.0001
rCT  0.1025 0.0999 <.0001 0.0963 0.0805  <.0001
rGM  0.1054 0.1038 <.0001 0.0995 0.0886  <.0001
FC  0.0447 0.0440 0.0843 0.0361 0.0304  <.0001
Yield  0.0208 0.0187 <.0001 0.0234 0.0218  0.0015
INST  0.2800 0.2961 <.0001 0.3345 0.3919  <.0001
Turnover  0.0030 0.0032 <.0001 0.0038 0.0047  <.0001
LogBM  -0.6644 -0.6826 <.0001 -0.2198 -0.6167  <.0001
LogLTG  2.8364 2.8959 <.0001 2.8284 2.6837  <.0001
LogDisp  -3.0081 -3.1823 <.0001 -3.1738 -3.3755  <.0001
ri  0.0971 0.0953 <.0001 0.0954 0.0824  <.0001
LogSize  4.6767 4.9345 <.0001 4.9970 5.5545  <.0001
βmkt  0.9444 0.9242 0.0080 0.9816 1.0046  <.0001
βsmb  0.8718 0.8189 0.1136 0.6260 0.5708  0.0544
βhml  0.2050 0.0655 0.0137 0.1572 0.2513  <.0001
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Table 2 Summary statistics – macro level variables 
 
This table reports summary statistics for macroeconomic variables for the periods surrounding 
TRA (JGTRRA) for the full sample (Panel A) and pre- and post- subsamples (Panel B). RREL is 
the monthly stochastically detrended risk-free rate following Campbell and Shiller (1988), Xrm 
is the monthly excess market return, Vm is the monthly volatility of the excess market return, 
GIP is the monthly industrial production growth rate, and CAY is the consumption-wealth ratio. 
For TRA, the pre-subsample spans 1/31/1995 to 3/31/1997 (firm quarters ended March 1995 
through March 1997) and the post-subsample spans 7/1/1997 to 12/31/1998 (firm quarters ended 
December 1996 through March 1997). For the JGTRRA in 2003, the pre-subsample spans 
1/1/2001 to 3/31/2003 and the post-subsample spans 7/1/2003 to 12/31/2004.  
 
Panel A: full sample 
       TRA          JGTRRA 
  Mean  Median Std Dev Mean Median  Std Dev
    
RREL  -0.0128 -0.0259 0.0602 -0.0620 -0.0415 0.0725
Xrm  0.0480 0.1286 0.2838 0.0162 0.0477  0.2256
Vm  3.5385 3.4695 1.9859 4.5356 4.2103  1.7549
GIP  0.0079 0.0070 0.0064 0.0010 0.0007  0.0053
CAY  0.0144 0.0216 0.0126 -0.0068 -0.0069  0.0116
    
 
 
Panel B: pre- vs. post 
  TRA JGTRRA 
  Pre      Post  Pr(diff=0) Pre     Post  Pr(diff=0)
    
RREL  0.0050 -0.0393 0.1707 -0.1015 -0.0029  0.0044
Xrm  0.1207 -0.0610 0.2377 -0.0375 0.0966  0.2748
Vm  2.7692 4.6926 0.0867 5.2779 3.4223  0.0394
GIP  0.0077 0.0083 0.8820 -0.0019 0.0053  0.0043
CAY  0.0235 0.0008 <.0001 0.0012 -0.0189  <.0001
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Table 3 Cost of capital — pre vs. post and interaction with financial constraint 
 
Panel A in this table presents the average cost of capital in the quarter immediately before and after the 
tax cut for TRA (JGTRRA) for high financial constrained (HFC) and low financial constrained (LFC) 
firms. It contrasts the changes in average cost of capital between high financially constrained and low 
financially constrained groups. The cost of equity capital estimates are based on Gebhardt, Lee, and 
Swaminathan (2001), Claus and Thomas (2001), and Gode and Mohanram (2003) for firm i at time t. 
Panel B shows the average cost of capital and the differences in the change of cost of capital for dividend- 
and non-dividend-paying subsamples. HFC (LFC) represents firm-quarters when the predicted financial 
constraint is above (below) the median financial constraint for the quarter immediately before the tax cut. 
For TRA, the pre-subsample consists of firm quarter ended in 1997Q1 and the post-subsample consists of 
firm quarter ended 1997Q3. For the JGTRRA, the pre-subsample consists of firm quarter ended in 
2003Q1 and the post-subsample consists of firm quarter ended in 2003Q3. * significant at 10%, ** 
significant at 5% and *** significant at 1% level. 
 
Panel A: Whole sample 
                     TRA JGTRRA 
  Pre  Post  Diff (Pre-Post)  Pre  Post  Diff (Pre-Post) 
          
 Average  (rAVE) 
          
HFC  0.1099 0.0939  0.0160***  0.0988  0.0829  0.0159*** 
LFC  0.0870 0.0781  0.0089***  0.0938  0.0822  0.0116*** 
Diff-in-Diff     0.0072***      0.0043*** 
  
 Gebhardt-Lee-Swaminathan  (rGLS) 
            
HFC  0.0914 0.0792  0.0121***  0.0955  0.0780  0.0175*** 
LFC  0.0797 0.0709  0.0089***  0.0933  0.0821  0.0113*** 
Diff-in-Diff     0.0033***      0.0063*** 
  
 Claus-Thomas  (rCT) 
            
HFC  0.1212 0.0997  0.0216***  0.1011  0.0791  0.0221*** 
LFC  0.0879 0.0776  0.0102***  0.0920  0.0777  0.0142*** 
Diff-in-Diff     0.0113***      0.0078*** 
          
 Gode-Mohanram  (rGM) 
            
HFC  0.1204 0.1030  0.0173***  0.1013  0.0875  0.0138*** 
LFC  0.0961 0.0870  0.0091***  0.0988  0.0872  0.0116*** 
Diff-in-Diff      0.0082***          0.0022* 
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Panel B: Dividend-paying versus non-dividend-paying subsamples 
 
                    TRA JGTRRA 
  Pre  Post  Diff (Pre-Post)  Pre  Post  Diff (Pre-Post) 
          
  Dividend-paying firms (rAVE) 
          
HFC  0.1062 0.0934  0.0128***  0.0952  0.0830  0.0122*** 
LFC  0.0855 0.0772  0.0083***  0.0933  0.0821  0.0112*** 
Diff-in-Diff      0.0045***          0.0010 
  
  Non-dividend paying firms (rAVE) 
          
HFC  0.1115 0.0941  0.0174***  0.1006  0.0828  0.0178*** 
LFC  0.0931 0.0819  0.0112***  0.0953  0.0823  0.0130*** 
Diff-in-Diff     0.0062***      0.0048*** 
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Table 4 Regression Analysis of the change of cost of equity capital and financial constraint 
during TRA and JGTRRA 
 
This table reports the panel regression results of the change of cost of equity capital on the probability of financial 
constraint during TRA and JGTRRA using the following specification: 
, 1 5
1 4 1 3 1 2 1 ˆ
it t Z it X it INST t Post
it INST it FC t Post it FC t Post it r
   
    
     
        
 
where  it r ˆ  is the average of three measures of the cost of equity capital based on Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan 
(2001), Claus and Thomas (2001), and Gode and Mohanram (2003) for firm i at time t, Post is a dummy variable 
which takes a value of 1 post-tax cut and 0 otherwise, FCit-1 represents the probability of financial constraint faced 
by firm i at time t-1, INSTit-1 is firm i’s percentage institutional ownership at time t-1, Xit represents firm level 
control variables, and  t Z  represents aggregate variables to control for the overall economic activities. The sample 
spans 1995Q1 to 1998Q4 for TRA and 2001Q1 to 2004Q4 for JGTRRA. We exclude 1997Q2 and 2003Q2 to 
remove possible transient effect. P-values are for two-sided test unless there is predicted sign.    
 
                 TRA             JGTRRA 
  Predicted sign  Estimate P-value Estimate P-value
Intercept    -0.0404 <.0001 -0.0402 <.0001
Post  -  -0.0066 <.0001 -0.0008 0.3419
FC  +  0.2059 <.0001 0.2595 0.0004
Post*FC  -  -0.0878 <.0001 -0.1192 0.0017
INST    -0.0022 0.1357 -0.0089 <.0001
Post*INST    0.0034 0.0104 0.0050 0.0003
Turnover    0.4328 0.0006 0.5649 <.0001
LogBM    0.0257 <.0001 0.0220 <.0001
LogLTG    0.0386 <.0001 0.0296 <.0001
LogDisp    -0.0009 <.0001 -0.0012 <.0001
ri    0.2890 <.0001 0.3801 <.0001
LogSize    0.0030 <.0001 0.0040 <.0001
βmkt    -0.0003 0.2461 -0.0028 <.0001
βsmb    0.0005 0.0304 -0.0006 0.4183
βhml    0.0004 0.0349 0.0013 0.0004
RREL1    0.0030 0.5802 -0.0088 0.3049
RREL2    0.0581 0.0063 0.0164 0.0727
Xrm1    0.0052 0.0613 -0.0052 <.0001
Xrm2    0.0036 0.0036 0.0027 0.0001
Dvm1    0.0011 0.0002 -0.0002 0.3762
Dvm2    0.0000 0.8829 0.0002 0.0811
GIP1    0.1679 0.0025 0.1146 0.0381
GIP2    0.0380 0.4900 0.4206 <.0001
CAY1    -0.3005 0.0002 0.1614 0.0018
N    31,320 26,981 
-2 Res 
loglikelihood 
  -172,341 -151,482   40
Table 5 Regression Analysis of the Change of Cost of Equity Capital and Financial Constraint 
for Firms with Different Dividend Policy 
 
 
This table reports the panel regression results of the change of cost of equity capital and financial 
constraint for firms with different dividend policy during TRA97 and JGTRRA using the 
following specification: 
 
it t Z it X it INST t Post it INST it HY t Post
it HY it FC
t
Post it FC it NDiv t Post it NDiv t Post it r
     
      
         
          
1 9 1 8 7
6 1 5 1 4 3 2 1 ˆ
 
 
where  it r ˆ  is the average of three measures of the cost of equity capital based on Gebhardt, Lee, 
and Swaminathan (2001), Claus and Thomas (2001), and Gode and Mohanram (2003) for firm i 
at time t, Post is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 post-tax cut and 0 otherwise, NDivit  
is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if firm i is non-dividend paying at time t and 0 
otherwise, HYit is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if firm i’s dividend yield is above 
the median dividend yield for quarter t and takes a value of 0 otherwise (we calculate dividend 
yield as four time the dividends declared in the most recent past quarter divided by the end of 
quarter price as in Naranjo, Nimalendran, and Ryngaert, 1998), FCit-1 represents the probability 
of financial constraint faced by firm i at time t-1, INSTit-1 is firm i’s percentage institutional 
ownership at time t-1, Xit represents firm level control variables, and  t Z  represents aggregate 
variables to control for the overall economic activities. The sample spans 1995Q1 to 1998Q4 for 
TRA and 2001Q1 to 2004Q4 for JGTRRA. We exclude 1997Q2 and 2003Q2 to remove possible 
transient effect. P-values are for two-sided test unless there is predicted sign. 
   41
 
  Predicted  TRA  JGTRRA 
  Sign  Estimate  P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value  Estimate P-value
Intercept    -0.0314  <.0001 -0.0408 <.0001 -0.0331 <.0001  -0.0419 <.0001
Post  -  -0.0086  <.0001 -0.0069 <.0001 -0.0018 0.1665  0.0013 0.2571
NDiv  ?  -0.0004  0.5798 -0.0016 0.0357 -0.0004 0.6916  -0.0015 0.1090
Post*NDiv  ?  -0.0019  0.0009 -0.0005 0.4257 -0.0015 0.0355  0.0001 0.9146
FC  +     0.2120 <.0001   0.2855 0.0003
Post*FC  -    -0.0751 0.0020    -0.1572 0.0004
HY  ?  0.0036  <.0001 0.0039 <.0001 0.0056 <.0001  0.0058 <.0001
Post*HY  -  0.0012  0.0372 0.0008 0.1783 -0.0036 <.0001  -0.0041 <.0001
INST    -0.0032  0.0290 -0.0021 0.1537 -0.0091 <.0001  -0.0079 <.0001
Post*INST    0.0054  <.0001 0.0036 0.0083 0.0056 0.0002  0.0037 0.0122
Turnover    0.4664  0.0002 0.4628 0.0002 0.5698 <.0001  0.5731 <.0001
LogBM    0.0251  <.0001 0.0253 <.0001 0.0215 <.0001  0.0215 <.0001
LogLTG    0.0391  <.0001 0.0388 <.0001 0.0299 <.0001  0.0297 <.0001
LogDisp    -0.0009  <.0001 -0.0009 <.0001 -0.0011 <.0001  -0.0012 <.0001
ri    0.2930  <.0001 0.2913 <.0001 0.3843 <.0001  0.3821 <.0001
LogSize    0.0020  <.0001 0.0028 <.0001 0.0033 <.0001  0.0039 <.0001
βmkt    -0.0002  0.3504 -0.0002 0.3007 -0.0025 <.0001  -0.0026 <.0001
βsmb    0.0005  0.0096 0.0005 0.0196 -0.0003 0.7213  -0.0005 0.5045
βhml    0.0003  0.0976 0.0004 0.0627 0.0010 0.0052  0.0012 0.0010
RREL1    0.0043  0.4372 0.0039 0.4753 -0.0084 0.3285  -0.0090 0.2982
RREL2    0.0511  0.0158 0.0552 0.0095 0.0150 0.0986  0.0166 0.0699
Xrm1    0.0038  0.1682 0.0048 0.0880 -0.0051 <.0001  -0.0051 <.0001
Xrm2    0.0029  0.0170 0.0034 0.0053 0.0025 0.0006  0.0026 0.0003
Dvm1    0.0010  0.0010 0.0011 0.0003 -0.0002 0.3397  -0.0002 0.3362
Dvm2    0.0001  0.5236 0.0000 0.7613 0.0002 0.0690  0.0002 0.0683
GIP1    0.1578  0.0042 0.1644 0.0030 0.0989 0.0723  0.1126 0.0418
GIP2    0.0545  0.3208 0.0468 0.3957 0.3708 <.0001  0.4103 <.0001
CAY1    -0.2768  0.0006 -0.2970 0.0002 0.1389 0.0069  0.1520 0.0031
N    31,495  31,320  27,066  26,981 
-2 Res loglikelihood  -173,200  -172,417  -151,898  -151,571 
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Table 6 Regression Analysis of the Change of Cost of Equity Capital for Financially Constrained 
Stocks with Different Taxable Individual Investor Ownership 
 
 
This table reports the panel regression results of the change of cost of equity capital on 
financially constrained firms with different taxable individual investor ownership during TRA 
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where  it r ˆ  is the average of three measures of the cost of equity capital based on Gebhardt, Lee, 
and Swaminathan (2001), Claus and Thomas (2001), and Gode and Mohanram (2003) for firm i 
at time t, Post is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 post-tax cut and 0 otherwise, HINDit 
(LINDit) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if  firm i’s individual investor ownership 
at time period t is above (below) the median individual investor ownership for all firms at period 
t,  HFCit ( LFCit) is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the probability of financial 
constraint is above (below) the firms’ median probability of financial constraint at quarter t and 
takes a value of 0 otherwise, Xit represents firm level control variables, and  t Z  represents 
aggregate variables to control for the overall economic activities. The sample spans 1995Q1 to 
1998Q4 for TRA and 2001Q1 to 2004Q4 for JGTRRA. We exclude 1997Q2 and 2003Q2 to 
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  Predicted                TRA           JGTRRA 
  Sign  Estimate P-value Estimate P-value
Intercept    -0.0365 <.0001 -0.0387 <.0001
Post  -  -0.0066 <.0001 0.0010 0.2787
HIND*LFC  ?  0.0016 0.0170 0.0015 0.0893
LIND*HFC  ?  0.0034 <.0001 0.0027 0.0071
HIND*HFC  ?  0.0053 <.0001 0.0062 0.0004
Post*HIND*LFC  -  -0.0009 0.1461 0.0001 0.4361
Post*LIND*HFC  -  -0.0028 0.0002 -0.0031 0.0016
Post*HIND*HFC  -  -0.0039 0.0006 -0.0057 0.0015
Turnover    0.4694 0.0001 0.4771 <.0001
LogBM    0.0253 <.0001 0.0217 <.0001
LogLTG    0.0389 <.0001 0.0296 <.0001
LogDisp    -0.0009 <.0001 -0.0010 <.0001
ri    0.2931 <.0001 0.3864 <.0001
LogSize    0.0026 <.0001 0.0036 <.0001
βmkt    -0.0002 0.2856 -0.0027 <.0001
βsmb    0.0005 0.0213 -0.0003 0.6833
βhml    0.0004 0.0460 0.0010 0.0046
RREL1    0.0034 0.5288 -0.0071 0.3923
RREL2    0.0625 0.0029 0.0122 0.1730
Xrm1    0.0056 0.0449 -0.0051 <.0001
Xrm2    0.0037 0.0021 0.0028 <.0001
Dvm1    0.0012 <.0001 -0.0002 0.4001
Dvm2    0.0000 0.9120 0.0002 0.0753
GIP1    0.1852 0.0007 0.1101 0.0432
GIP2    0.0352 0.5194 0.3585 <.0001
CAY1    -0.3265 <.0001 0.1547 0.0021
N    31,734 27,958 
-2 Res loglikelihood    -174,166 -156,681 
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Table 7 Robustness Analysis on the Changes of Cost of Equity of Financially Constrained Firms 
during TRA and JGTRRA 
 
 
This table reports the robustness analysis of the panel regression estimation using an alternative 
measure of the probability of financial constraint for firms based only on firm size and age (SA 
Index) as in Hadlock and Pierce (2010). Specifically, columns (1) and (2) show the base case 
results of the change of cost of equity capital on the probability of financial constraint for both 
TRA and JGTRRA; columns (3) reports the results of the change of cost of equity capital for 
firms with different dividend policy with and without financial constraint measure for JGTRRA; 
columns (4) and (5) provide the results of the change of cost of equity capital on financially 
constrained firms with different taxable individual investor ownership during TRA and 
JGTRRA. 
 
The dependent variable it r ˆ  is the average of three measures of the cost of equity capital based on 
Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001), Claus and Thomas (2001), and Gode and Mohanram 
(2003) for firm i at time t, Post is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 post-tax cut and 0 
otherwise, FCit represents the probability of financial constraint faced by firm i at time t, INSTit-1 
is firm i’s percentage institutional ownership at time t-1, NDivit is dummy variable which takes a 
value of 1 if firm i is non-dividend paying at time t and 0 otherwise, HFCit (LFCit) is a dummy 
variable which takes a value of 1 if the probability of financial constraint faced by firm i at time t 
is above (below) the median probability of financial constraint for all stocks at time t and takes a 
value 0 otherwise, HYit is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if firm i’s dividend yield is 
above (below) the median dividend yield for quarter t and takes a value of 0 otherwise, HINDit 
(LINDit) is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if  firm i’s individual investor ownership 
at time period t is above (below) the median individual investor ownership for all firms at period 
t, Xit represents firm level control variables, and  t Z  represents aggregate variables to control for 
the overall economic activities. The sample spans 1995Q1 to 1998Q4 for TRA and 2001Q1 to 
2004Q4 for JGTRRA. We exclude 1997Q2 and 2003Q2 to remove possible transient effect.  
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  Predicted  TRA JGTRRA TRA JGTRRA TRA  JGTRRA
  sign  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6)
Post  -  -0.0071 -0.0005 -0.0077 0.0023 -0.0064  0.0009
    <.0001 0.8010 <.0001 0.2627 <.0001  0.5777
NDiv  ?  -0.0013 -0.0021  
    0.1003 0.0242  
Post*NDiv  ?  -0.0011 0.0004  
    0.0918 0.6541  
SAIndex  +  0.2184 0.4468 0.2288 0.5124  
    <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001  
Post*SAIndex  -  -0.0574 -0.1134 -0.0286 -0.1763   
    0.0071 0.0034 0.2613 <.0001   
HY  ?  0.0038 0.0061  
    <.0001 <.0001  
Post*HY  -  0.0007 -0.0042  
    0.2140 <.0001  
INST    -0.0021 -0.0081 -0.0021 -0.0068  
    0.1598 <.0001 0.1637 <.0001  
Post*INST    0.0039 0.0050 0.0044 0.0033  
    0.0021 0.0003 0.0010 0.0265  
HIND*LFC           0.0028  0.0013
           0.0007  0.1870
LIND*HFC           0.0031  0.0040
           <.0001  <.0001
HIND*HFC           0.0041  0.0072
           <.0001  <.0001
Post*HIND*LFC  -        -0.0011  0.0002
           0.2724  0.8216
Post*LIND*HFC  -        -0.0025  -0.0019
           0.0003  0.0236
Post*HIND*HFC  -        -0.0035  -0.0040
           0.0020  0.0062
 